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Simulations in 3D tactics, interdiction and multi-agent modelling
Abstract
The analysis of vulnerabilities in large complex spaces is fundamentally problematic. The lack of capacity
to generate a threat assessment merely exacerbates this problem. Lacking as well, in current literature is
a developed methodology. To overcome this problem, we propose an approach using multi-agent
modelling, which is also melded with three dimensional (3D) tactical understandings. Our approach builds
on a microsimulation decision support tool, which was developed for a behavioural simulation of CBRN
events. Microsimulation is based on the individual; who as an individual has a number of attributes, and
which are stochastic (when repeated within an attribute). This approach is then enveloped. The
simulations approach is intended for simulation of global and social controls and is designed to deal
effectively with separate population groups. Each group has rules based on the group’s behaviour and
attributes, and complex scenarios can be built very simply. This therefore, enables analysis of emergent
group behaviours and patterns. Our approach is akin to chemical or fire spread quantification. It views
particle spread analysis as synonymous with complex movement (or stationary location) of many active
agents within a complex 3D environment. This approach, we believe is needed to ‘solve’ the counter
terrorism problem presented by scenarios such as the 2007 Haymarket attack; such as, how to analyse
such events, as well as develop effective interdiction. A discrete behaviour model approach is suggested.
This approach through repeated simulation (within the same parameters) should build up a statistical
pattern of domain behaviour. As well, information on the outcome of changing behaviour can also be
logged. Therefore, individual outcomes can be matched against real-time data to give best prediction of
eventual outcomes, and the range of future strategies based on closest approach to reality. Taking this
approach, potential targets could then be given random attributes including movement, size, speed,
destination, and degree of deception being used in behaviour. Superimposing targets from known
information and still building in random attributes about what is not known, will allow forward prediction
with back-correction over time as information becomes more available. As well, failure rates and other
assumptions could also be gradually relaxed, and this will allow for continuous assessment of
assumptions as real data becomes available.
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Abstract. The analysis of vulnerabilities in large complex spaces is fundamentally problematic. The lack of capacity
to generate a threat assessment merely exacerbates this problem. Lacking as well, in current literature is a developed
methodology. To overcome this problem, we propose an approach using multi-agent modelling, which is also
melded with three dimensional (3D) tactical understandings. Our approach builds on a microsimulation decision
support tool, which was developed for a behavioural simulation of CBRN events. Microsimulation is based on the
individual; who as an individual has a number of attributes, and which are stochastic (when repeated within an
attribute). This approach is then enveloped. The simulations approach is intended for simulation of global and social
controls and is designed to deal effectively with separate population groups. Each group has rules based on the
group’s behaviour and attributes, and complex scenarios can be built very simply. This therefore, enables analysis of
emergent group behaviours and patterns. Our approach is akin to chemical or fire spread quantification. It views
particle spread analysis as synonymous with complex movement (or stationary location) of many active agents
within a complex 3D environment. This approach, we believe is needed to ‘solve’ the counter terrorism problem
presented by scenarios such as the 2007 Haymarket attack; such as, how to analyse such events, as well as develop
effective interdiction. A discrete behaviour model approach is suggested. This approach through repeated simulation
(within the same parameters) should build up a statistical pattern of domain behaviour. As well, information on the
outcome of changing behaviour can also be logged. Therefore, individual outcomes can be matched against realtime data to give best prediction of eventual outcomes, and the range of future strategies based on closest approach
to reality. Taking this approach, potential targets could then be given random attributes including movement, size,
speed, destination, and degree of deception being used in behaviour. Superimposing targets from known information
and still building in random attributes about what is not known, will allow forward prediction with back-correction
over time as information becomes more available. As well, failure rates and other assumptions could also be
gradually relaxed, and this will allow for continuous assessment of assumptions as real data becomes available.

1. INTRODUCTION
The very nature of large complex spaces, and the
dynamic of many free agents – people, traffic etc.,
produces a confused environment. In classical military
theory, this is identified as generating the fog of war,
this nullifying battlefield transparency [1]. The key
problem is that events transpire simultaneously, as an
undivided and continuous set of events/actions, which
occur at the same time. Overcoming these conceptual
difficulties, we have developed in our more recent work
on 3D tactics the formulation –
“3D tactics is premised on ‘area analyses’ where the
entire space surrounding a target is subject to
continuous simultaneous review, constantly seeking out
multidimensional attack.” [1] [2]
This paper develops the current research in the area of
3D vulnerabilities modelling, linking this to modelling
multiagent movement and interdiction.

2.
SUMMARY OF
ANALYSIS CONCEPT

THE

3-D

TACTICS

We have previously proposed a line model to
demonstrate the 3D tactics concept which is reproduced
in Figure 1. [4] This example develops a ‘look-around’
analysis; encouraging thinking tactically in three
dimensions,
and
simultaneously
watching
multidimensional actions. Using tools such as these, we
can begin to identify within complex spaces, and among
seemingly diffuse vulnerabilities and opportunities,
clear target and defence patterns. We have previously
found that accommodating the full context of a complex
space, seeking to identify the clustering of
vulnerabilities and targets in 3D spaces is near –
impossible [2] [4]. For instance, in the case of the 2007
Haymarket attack, it was the vigilance of ambulance
crews and parking staff who noticed the vehicles.
However, it was purely happenstance that these
weapons were identified at all. The use of vehicles,
carrying improvised explosive devices (IEDs), of a type

typically seen parked there, at a time when no one
would potentially notice, explains the success of the
perpetrators. Successful, because they were able to
exploit the inherent information deception attributes of
this space, and deploys these IEDs in the first place [2].
Figure 1 demonstrates these dynamic, between
opportunities (O), vulnerabilities (V) and targets, in
complex or 3D tactical environments [3].
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Figure 1. 3D Tactical Environment: Identifying where
Opportunities (O) and Vulnerabilities (V) link.
This model identifies an open space between two built
areas (identified as buildings ‘A’ and ‘B’).
Demonstrated are the links between attack opportunities
and vulnerabilities, such as found in multi-level
buildings, large transit spaces, covered rail stations,
plazas, commercial precincts and malls. The basic 3D
tactics concept, articulated here is that within the
building and space, there are many vulnerabilities
(represented V1 to V4), illustrative of dynamic
multiagent moving or stationary within the
environment. However, only certain vulnerabilities are
paired with opportunities. These paired ‘V+O’ are
usually linear linked by some common line of transport
(i.e. a road). This allows these to be targeted. The line of
targets presents an attacker with multiple opportunities.
Using a potential problem (opportunity analysis)
approach to the scenario described in Figure 1 identifies
the direction, risks, and myriad of other things that can
give an advantage. The key question is how in a
multiagent environment, do we develop effective
interdiction?
3. INTERDICTION THEORY
Maritime interdiction and land-air Interdiction
operations have developed some of the key concepts.
Land-air interdiction theory regards as essential, that
when affecting interdiction, achieves a ‘significant
volume of space free from an adversary’s interference’.
[7] As well, one of the adversaries needs to be able to
deny his opponent ‘entry to a significant volume of
airspace, yet allow friendly forces freedom of
manoeuvre.’ [7] The second essential concept identified
important is that interdiction, to be successful – it has to
‘destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military
potential before it can be brought to bear effectively
against friendly forces, at such distance from friendly
forces’ [6]
Fundamentally, any movement in space by an agent will
travel along a path, while the direction, speed and height

will be determined by factors such as mode of
movement, and influenced by taking the line of least
resistance avoiding contact or collision with other
agents, or obstacles located along the movement line.
Interdiction seeks to anticipate the line of approach of
an agent, and either intercept before it reaches its target
or as close as possible to its place of origin [3]. Little
however, has been developed in regard to modelling
capacity. For instance, dynamic queuing modelling has
been advocated – this methodology: “consists of a set of
things arriving at a system and seeking service (or to
avoid service), a number of servers seeking to provide
(impose) service, and a set of behaviour guidelines for
arrivals and servers.” [5]
Problematically, the queuing approach seeks to develop
an ordering, and it is therefore heavily dependent on the
scenario(s) chosen and introduces a constraint on the
analysis. As sensing through intelligence and
surveillance is at the centre of this method, then judicial
used of this data with forecasting and backcastng
models would be a more realistic approach to this
interception problem. Difficulties also arise from
considering the real chaotic environment. The challenge
is authenticating many dynamic agents simultaneously.
We propose a different approach akin to chemical or
fire spread mathematical quantification; here, the
complex movement of many active agents through a 3D
environment offers insight into how to develop tactics.
This mathematical approach will be reviewed next.
4. MULTIAGENCY MODELLING
The alternative approach to interception is the use of a
random or chaotic model of individual behaviour that
captures the elements of reality and avoids the major
pitfall of steady state approaches, which subsumes
important dynamic factors by aggregation and hence
these are effectively forgotten about. This is similar to
analysis of catastrophic accidents, where the time
element on the factors that lead to the accident is
effectively lost.
Microsimulation is a discrete simulation technique
which allows for the modelling of the behaviour of
single individuals in a complex system [1] [8]. It was
originally devised for financial and economic modelling
[11] [9], but is generally applicable to a wide range of
scenarios. In the current research project, we have
created a modular, scalable microsimulation package,
called Simulacron, which allows for the rapid creation
of microsimulations involving large numbers of people
interacting with each other and their environment. A
new simulation module has been integrated with the
existing components. This new module, the “TPC”
system, will allow the modelling of three distinct groups
with differing behaviours as follows:
•

Terrorists (the ‘T’ group): These are individuals
who move through the environment until, at a
predetermined moment in time, they attack, causing
the ‘deaths’ of any individuals sharing their
location. Each terrorist has, in addition to standard

model parameters, a ‘camouflage factor’ (Fc) which
determines how effective they are at concealing
themselves from law enforcement.
•

•

Police (the ‘P’ group): These are individuals who
move through the environment attempting to detect
terrorist presence. If a police officer detects a
terrorist, then that terrorist is ‘killed’ (and removed
from the simulation). Each police officer has, in
addition to standard model parameters, a
‘perception factor’ (Fp) which determines how
effective they are at spotting the bad guys.
Citizens (the ‘C’ group): These are the remaining
individuals in the environment. They do not
participate in the simulation except in the sense that
they could be killed at any moment.

Detection is deemed to have occurred if, in any
simulated period of time in which a terrorist and a
police officer are collocated, a randomly determined
value falls below the detection threshold defined by Fp
(1 – Fc). Similarly the terrorist has a probability option
to blow themselves upon detection. This basic model
may be varied by changing properties in a logical
manner. For example, replacing the instantaneous
lethality of the terrorist attack with a probabilistic one (a
smaller bomb) or replacing it with a conventional
infective state, simulating the release of a biological
agent. Because of the flexibility of the program, police
behaviours can range from completely random to
precisely specified. The latter, allowing the
investigation and validation of predetermined
interdiction strategies such as those derived from gametheoretic modelling [10].

5

As an example of this approach Figure 2 shows the
outcome for ten repeated simulations within a ‘model’
community of 400 houses; and 940 people; with one or
two terrorists; and with 930 workplaces of various
types.
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Figure 2. Frequency of casualties for one and two
terrorist in a community of 940 people. The first and
second attempts refer to the two terrorist scenario.
Figure 2 illustrates the following scenario - the target
for the terrorists is the ‘club’ at 9:23 pm on a Friday
night. The program is run ten times with ten police
trying to intercept either one or two terrorists
respectively within this community. The terrorists have

a camouflage factor of 0.8 and a 50% chance that they
will commit suicide if discovered early. The police have
a perception factor of 0.8. The simulation starts on the
previous Monday at 6:00 am. Figure 2 shows the
numbers of deaths as a function of the frequency within
each range.
In the ten runs with the single terrorist, the results were:
•

Police intercept and arrest on 3 occasions.

•

On four occasions there were casualties in excess of
60 people, of which only one was at the target time;
the other three occasions, (two at the club and one
at the cinema) the terrorist pre-emptively
committed suicide on being intercepted.

•

On the remaining three occasions the terrorist also
took pre-emptive action resulting in less than 60
casualties. These occurred in shops and a restaurant
respectively.

With two terrorists in the community, one complete
interdiction occurred (arrest of both in the same run),
even though the first and second terrorists were arrested
four times each. Neither terrorist made it to the
designated target time and chose pre-emptive suicide on
the other occasions of discovery rather than arrest. The
highest casualty rate occurred with two events occurring
four days apart at the club. This demonstrates the ability
to model coordinated attacks.
While these results are very preliminary, they
demonstrate the ability to model both terrorist tactics
and to study alternative interdiction strategies and relate
those to the environment under study. An advantage of
this discrete behaviour modelling is that multi agency
resources as well as antagonistic behaviours of targets
can easily be programmed into a simulation. Repeated
simulation with the same parameters builds up a
statistical pattern of domain behaviour as well as
information on the outcome of changing the behaviour.
If surveillance and intelligence data is available, then
individual outcomes can be matched against real time
data to give best prediction of the eventual outcome as
well as the range of future strategies based on closest
approach to reality. This uses a back correction forward
predictor approach to modelling the outcome.
If you take customs maritime interception as an example
against smuggling then you might have finite resources
in planes, ships and shore people available. And these
might be dispersed over several different agencies. Each
resource has its own attributes including availability,
location, speed etc. that dictate the range of surveillance
and interception capabilities at any one time. Similarly
targets can be given random attributes such as
movement, size, speed, destination, degree of deception
being used in behaviour that allows optimisation of
deployment against them. This can be used as a
planning
tool
for
resourcing
requirements.
Superimposing targets from known information but still
building in random attributes about what is not known
allows forward prediction with back correction over
time. As long as concurrent information is deployed to

all resources then tasking becomes a relatively simple
matter to achieve a desired rate of success.
A question that arises in this approach is at what point
do intervention strategies depend on resourcing
availability before the system starts to fail? And, is
there, an optimum amount of information required for a
given success rate? These can also be tested in this type
of modelling approach as well as alternative interdiction
strategies. Standard interdiction models deal poorly with
dispersed areas of surveillance and the time taken to
achieve interdiction unless targets can be corralled.
Even this involves a seven stage process of which one
or more elements might fail. Furthermore what happens
when intelligence gathered is part of a deception
operation? A discrete behaviour model on the other
hand can assess these types of changes because the
statistics can be built up rather than assumed, such as
failure rates, and other assumptions can also be
gradually relaxed. This allows for continuous
assessment of assumptions as real data becomes
available. A critical process though is simultaneous
display of exactly the same data across disparate control
centres and resources so everybody is using exactly the
same data in real time and where real time feedback on
decisions can be used to enhance interpretation of the
data and make forward predictions.
As an example, let us consider the 2007 attempted
bombings in the London Haymarket, where an attempt
was made to triangulate and sequentially detonate two
car bombs. Analysis of this type of problem before the
fact requires an analysis of the space and its use over
time. This analysis is twofold, the analysis of the
connectivity between spaces which can be used to
determine where people can go and analysis of typical
movement of people throughout the day. Both of these
are then used to set up population movement in the
domain of interest. Overlaying alternative behaviours
such as interdiction agencies responses and the cues on
which they act as well as alternative aggressor strategies
allows analysis of the space for terrorist opportunities
and the likely interdiction. Many different weapon
systems can be assessed because each has its own
constraints related to the space and geography, which
dictate how these can be deployed. It also allows for
testing of interdictions strategies and response to an
event based on different degrees of intelligence or
surveillance as well as determining the most effective
use of data coming from that space.
5. CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper is to combine basic 3D tactical
analysis concept with multiagent modelling and
interdiction tactics theory, thus developing a more
dynamic analysis. We believe, this approach leads us on
the way to developing more advanced 3D GIS –based
tool as a planning device when developing counter
terrorist plans for complex spaces. The object of such a
tool is to demonstrate where in complex environments
the critical path of multiagent threats can be interdicted.
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